Effects of the Completition of MERCOSUR on the Uruguayan Labor Market. A simulation exercies using a CGE model by Silvia Laens & María Inés Terra
EFFECTS OF THE COMPLETION OF MERCOSUR ON THE
URUGUAYAN LABOR MARKET
A simulation exercise using a CGE model
Silvia Laens
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas
(CINVE)
18 de Julio 1324 Piso 6º.
Montevideo, 11100   URUGUAY
Tel.: (598 2) 900 3051




– Facultad de Ciencias Sociales
Rodó 1854
Montevideo, 11200   URUGUAY
Tel: (598 2) 409 2973
Fax: (598 2) 408 1917
e-mail: ines@decon.edu.uy
This paper is an academic version of a study carried out for the “Programa de
Fortalecimiento de las Areas Sociales”, Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto,
Uruguay.
The authors wish to thank the very helpful suggestions received from Prof. Jean
Mercenier.
September 1999ABSTRACT
The Mercosur was born as an imperfect Customs Union. During the transition phase to a
complete Customs Union -starting in 1995-, each country established some exceptions to
trade liberalization within the region and to the external common tariff. This paper deals
with the possible effects on the Uruguayan labor market of the elimination of those
exceptions. With that purpose, the changes in tariffs during the transition are simulated with
a Computable General Equilibrium model.
The model is specified for the Uruguayan economy but three other regions are considered:
Argentina, Brazil and the rest of the world. There are nine sectors in the model, six of
which are assumed to work under imperfect competition while the rest are perfectly
competitive. In the sectors with imperfect competition a Bertrand type behavior is assumed.
The labor market is segmented in skilled and unskilled labor and wages are flexible.
The results show that the overall effects on the main variables and on the labor market are
not important. The most significant changes are found in trade flows. However, at the
sectoral level relevant changes are found in consumption, output, trade and factor allocation
in those sectors that are most affected by the intra-zone liberalization or by the complete
enforcement of the Common External Tariff.
RESUMEN
El Mercosur se establece como una  unión aduanera imperfecta. En 1995 comenzó un
período de transición en que se mantienen excepciones al libre comercio intrazona y al
arancel externo común. El documento discute los posibles efectos sobre el mercado de
trabajo de Uruguay de la eliminación de dichas excepciones. Con ese fin se especifica un
modelo de equilibrio general computable y se simulan las variaciones de los aranceles que
habrán de tener lugar en el período.
El modelo se especifica para Uruguay pero se consideran otras dos regiones: el Mercosur y
el resto del mundo. Es un modelo multisectorial con sectores en competencia perfecta y en
competencia imperfecta. Se consideran bienes diferenciados usando una especificación de
tipo Armington. En los sectores en competencia imperfecta se supone formación de precios
de tipo Bertrand.
Se distingue entre mano de obra calificada y no calificada y se hacen simulaciones bajo
distintas hipótesis respecto al funcionamiento del mercado de trabajo.
Los resultados que los efectos globales sobre las principales variables y sobre el mercado de
trabajo no son relevantes. Sin embargo, a nivel sectorial se detectan importantes cambios en
la producción, el comercio y el mercado de factores.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Mercosur started in 1991 when the Asunción Treaty was signed between Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay with the purpose of building a common market. During the
first years, progress was made towards total liberalization of intra-zone trade. In 1995 a
Common External Tariff (CET) was enforced, leading to the existence of an “imperfect”
customs union among the four countries. The imperfections are due to the existence of
exceptions to free trade inside the zone and also to the complete enforcement of the CET.
This first stage of Mercosur caused a significant adjustment in the Uruguayan
economy. The share of manufacturing industry in total GDP and in total employment went
down while important changes occurred in the composition of production and employment
within the manufacturing sector.
Starting in 1995 further progress was made in the gradual elimination of both types
of exceptions through the establishment of several special regimes. The goods affected by
these special regimes belonged to the most sensitive sectors in each country, whose
adjustment to the Mercosur rules presented the greatest difficulties. In those cases, the
solution was to establish longer schedules for the achievement of total intra-zone
liberalization and for the convergence to the CET.
Two aspects raise the greatest concern for the future of the Uruguayan economy. On
the one hand, the tariff reduction for the most sensitive goods may have an important effect
on domestic production. On the other hand, the rise in external tariffs (applicable to third
countries) of capital goods, telecommunications and computer-related goods (which had
very low tariffs in Uruguay) may endanger the technological updating of all activities in the
country.
According to theory, the welfare effect of a discriminatory elimination of tariff
barriers is ambiguous, depending on the prevailing market structures. In perfect
competition, the net welfare effect depends on the extent of trade creation or trade diversion
generated by the discriminatory policies. Under imperfect competition, other factors are
added: economies of scale, degree of competition and consumption variety.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been widely used to study the
effects of either unilateral or negotiated trade policies. Particularly, they have been used to
study different aspects concerning the European Union
1 and, more recently, the creation of
the NAFTA.
2 The Mercosur also gave origin to several studies with multicountry models,
                                                
1  Among other, see Spencer (1986), Smith and Venables (1988), Mercenier (1992), etc.
2  Among others, see Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson (1991), Brown et al. (1992) and all the studies in
Francois and Shiells (1994).2
which in general included only the big countries (Argentina and Brazil).
3
In this paper we analyze the impact on the Uruguayan labor market of the
elimination of the special regimes in Mercosur, using a CGE model. Therefore, the model
presented here is a different contribution to the analysis of Mercosur, as long as it poses the
viewpoint of one of the smaller members of the agreement.
The model conceives the Uruguayan economy as a small economy with trade
relations with three other countries or regions (Argentina, Brazil and the rest of the world)
which are considered exogenous. Another particular feature of this model is the existence of
non-competitive market structures in some sectors and the presence of scale economies.
These structural features are crucial for the realism of the model. In the Uruguayan
case the size of the domestic market and the long tradition of high protection on domestic
production led to a significant concentration of production and to the existence of non-
competitive markets, particularly in the manufacturing sector.  In order to compare the
effects under different assumptions regarding market structure, two versions of the model
were specified: perfect competition and Bertrand competition. This comparison facilitates
the understanding of how the results may change if markets are more or less competitive.
The model is static so only the effects on resource allocation and on income
distribution can be analyzed. On the contrary, it does not enable the study of the dynamic
effects generated by the completion of the customs union.
It should be noticed that the tariffs that were used in the simulations were a simple
average of those applicable to all items in the Harmonized System belonging to each sector.
However, the Uruguayan production might be biased towards goods with the highest tariffs
and, therefore, the actual tariff variations might be larger than those simulated in this paper.
Therefore, the impact of the completion of the customs union might be underestimated, but
a priori the sign of the effects should be those found in the simulation exercises.
In the next section of this paper there is a brief description of the convergence
schedules of Mercosur to the Customs Union and the identification of the most affected
sectors. In section 3, the main features of the model are described. Section 4 explains how
the model was calibrated from the available data and the simulations carried out. Finally,
the results and conclusions of the analysis are presented.
                                                
3  Hinojosa-Ojeda et al (1997) use this methodology to analyze the relations between Mercosur and
Nafta, taking into account only the two largest countries. The same criterion is adopted by Diao and
Somwaru (1996) who analyze the relations between Mercosur and the United States and also by
Behar (1991). Nin and Terra (1998) analyze the alternative of integration or unilateral opening.
Mercenier and Cavalcante (1997) and Flores (1997) are exceptions, as their Mercosur models also
include Uruguay.3
2. THE COMPLETION OF MERCOSUR AND THE MAIN SECTORS
AFFECTED
4
As it was said before, Mercosur started in 1991 with the purpose of creating a
common market among the four member countries. From 1991 to 1994 reciprocal trade was
liberalized to a great extent as intra-zone tariffs were lowered to zero for a high percentage
of the items in the Harmonized System. However, the four countries kept some goods away
from that liberalization process, reducing tariffs more slowly or even leaving some of them
unchanged in a number of cases. In December 1994, in Ouro Preto the institutional
structure of Mercosur was finally defined and a whole set of rules was approved leading to
the effective enforcement of a customs union (CU) with exceptions by January 1st, 1995.
In this second phase of Mercosur, the intra-zone tariff reductions carried out until
that moment were consolidated and time schedules were established for the complete
liberalization of those goods still protected by tariffs. At the same time the Common
External Tariff (CET) was approved for trade with third countries and was enforced from
January 1995, but maintaining special treatments for several categories of goods excepted
from the immediate enforcement of the CET. Therefore, an “imperfect” CU was created, as
many goods were excepted from the general principle of free reciprocal trade and from the
CET.
In the case of intra-zone trade, each country made a list of the “sensitive” products
which had not been liberalized as yet. Those four lists (one for each country) would follow
a liberalization schedule laid down in the Adapting Regime to Mercosur (“Régimen de
Adecuación al Mercosur”). This regime provided an additional time limit for the complete
liberalization of intra-zone trade. This time horizon was scheduled to end by January 1999
in the case of Argentina and Brazil while the lists set up by Uruguay and Paraguay would
complete the tariff reduction by January 2000. All goods in these lists would be subject to a
linear and automatic tariff reduction starting from the prevailing tariffs by August 1994
minus an initial preference. The Uruguayan list contained 952 items of the “Nomenclatura
Común del Mercosur” (NCM), compatible with the Harmonized System. The average tariff
for all those items by August 1994 was 19,1%. The initial preference reduced that average
to 17,9% in 1996 and then from January 1997 the tariffs were reduced by 25% each year
until January 2000 when they would be completely eliminated. Besides, 356 of those items
were simultaneously excepted from the CET, because otherwise the intra-zone tariff would
be higher than the external tariff. In this case, a descending schedule was set up to reduce
the average tariff for third countries from 23,7% to 14,8% by January 2000. By that time,
the convergence to the CU for this set of products would be completed (see Table 1).
                                                
4  This section is based on Laens and Terra (1998).4
There are two types of exceptions to the CET  of Mercosur: the properly called
exceptions and the trade preferences established in bilateral trade agreements with other
countries in the context of ALADI. The latter are renegotiated case by case and are not
considered in this paper. The properly called exceptions (a total of 1910 items of the NCM
in the Uruguayan case) are included in several lists that follow different schedules (see
Table 1).
Table 1
Adapting Regime and exceptions to the CET (URUGUAY)
Tariff convergence schedules












1/1/2000 1/1/2001 1/1/2000 1/1/2006 1/1/2006 1/1/2006




CET 15,9 12,9 14,8 11,2 8,2 11,4
CET 1998-2000 16,0 17,8 11,2 8,2 12,3
External tariff (*)
1995 5,9  23,7  0,2 0,0 4,7
2000 10,6 17,8 4,9 4,5 7,5
2001 12,9 14,8 6,5 5,7 8,3
2006 12,9 14,8 11,0 10,1 11,3
Source: Based on data from MEF.
(*) Simple average
Apart from the case of the exceptions originated in the Adapting Regime, in all the
other convergence schedules the tariffs move upwards (see Table 1). Therefore, for the
whole set of exceptions the average tariff increases from 4.7% to 11.4%.
Finally, in addition to the special regimes already described there are two more
groups of goods that do not receive the same treatment in all the Mercosur countries. These
are 76 items belonging to the automotive sector and 4 items from the sugar sector. In these
cases, there has been no agreement concerning a liberalization schedule for intra-zone trade
neither the CET for trade with third countries has been set.5
In order to classify the activity sectors according to the extent of their affectation by
the special regimes described, every item in each list was assigned to the activity sector
where they belong (four digits of the ISIC rev. 2). Most of the manufacturing sectors had
one or more products affected by some of the special regimes, as it is shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Special regimes of Mercosur




Adapting Regime 952 60
Exceptions due to adapt. regime 358 37
Uruguayan exceptions list 304 33




Automotive and sugar sectors 80 3
Source: Based on data from the MEF
The sectors with the largest number of “sensitive” products are the chemical
industries (ISIC 35), and the textiles, clothing and leather industries (ISIC 32), where the
items in the Adapting Regime represented 25% of the total. The metallic products,
machinery and equipment industries (ISIC 38) followed with 16% of the items and the
food, beverages and tobacco industries (ISIC 31) accumulated another 9% of total items.  In
the case of the exceptions to the CET, the most affected sectors are those manufacturing
chemicals, iron and steel, capital goods and computer and telecommunications - related
goods.
The sectors defined at the four-digit level of the ISIC were grouped according to the
degree of affectation by the special regimes, using two indicators. The first one is the
average intra-zone tariff (IZT) in 1995, which measures the average protection each sector
received before the Adapting Regime schedule started. The second one is the difference
between the external or extra-zone tariff (EZT) and the CET in 1995, which indicates the
degree of affectation each sector will have from the exceptions convergence schedules. The
groups obtained are shown in Table 3 with the average intra-zone and extra-zone tariffs by
the time each of the special regimes come to an end.
The first group (PRIM) produces agricultural and mining products without further
elaboration. It is hardly affected by the Adapting Regime and by exceptions to the CET. In
1995 the intra-zone tariff was very close to zero and the extra-zone tariff was almost equal
to the CET. The second group (EXPRO) is composed by several sectors that will very likely6
be affected by the elimination of the Adapting Regime and the exceptions to the CET. They
are relatively protected sectors whose extra-zone tariff in 1995 was higher than the CET.
Several sectors oriented to the Mercosur countries (the dairy industry, the fabrication of
tires and the textile industry) belong to this group.
The third and fourth groups are sectors affected by the Adapting Regime but not by
the exceptions. Most food, beverages and tobacco industries belong to the third group while
the fourth one is composed of paper products, rubber products, plastics and ceramics. The
fifth group (BSK) gathers all sectors basically affected by the elimination of exceptions,
particularly capital goods and computer and telecommunications - related goods. These
goods have ascending convergence schedules to the CET. Uruguay does not have a
significant production of these goods. The sixth group (EXP), should not be affected by any
of the special regimes because it is composed by sectors with comparative advantages
which sell most of their production to third countries (rice mills, beef and hides). The
seventh group (INQUIM) contains sectors affected by exceptions with ascending
convergence schedules, particularly the basic chemical products and fertilizers. Finally, the
eighth group (EXCL) gathers three protected sectors: the automotive industry and the sugar
industry (whose treatment has not been agreed in Mercosur) and the oil refining industry, a
highly regulated sector whose performance will depend on the competition policy finally
adopted.
A ninth sector was considered in the model (SERV) including all services and non-
manufacturing industries, which are basically non-tradables, not affected by commercial
policies. Table 4 shows several indicators of production and trade for each group.7
Table 3
Simple average tariffs by groups (sectors)
In force by: Foreseen by: Difference Tariff preference
Nº of 1/1/1995 1/1/2000 1/1/2001 1/1/2006 CET - EZT given to Mercosur partners
items IZT EZT IZT EZT EZT CET 1995 1995 2006 Difference
PRIM 568 0.4 5.8 0.0 5.6 5.7 5.7 -0.1 5.4 5.7 0.3
EXPRO 1227 5.9 17.4 0.0 15.7 15.8 15.8 1.6 11.5 15.8 4.2
ALIREG 278 4.7 13.4 0.0 12.8 12.9 12.9 0.6 8.7 12.9 4.2
OREG 290 6.8 15.6 0.0 15.1 15.2 15.4 0.2 8.8 15.4 6.6
BSK 2298 1.3 7.0 0.0 7.0 7.0 13.6 -6.6 5.7 13.6 7.9
EXP 398 0.7 9.9 0.0 9.7 9.7 9.8 0.1 9.2 9.8 0.6
INQUIM 2898 1.4 8.3 0.0 8.1 8.7 8.7 -0.5 6.9 8.7 1.9
EXCL 244 1.3 9.9 1.3 9.9 9.9 13.5 -3.6 8.7 12.2 3.6
Total 7633 2.4 10.0 0.0 9.6 9.8 11.9 -2.0 7.6 11.9 4.4
Source: Elaborated from MEF data.8
Table 4
Economic indicators by group (sector)













PRIM 7.3 7.1 11.2 10.7 19.9 0.5 0.6 1.2
EXPRO 8.1 17.3 7.7 23.5 14.3 1.5 1.5 0.8
ALIREG 7.2 2.8 4.4 4.3 7.3 1.1 1.3 0.9
OREG 2.8 2.7 5.6 10.5 25.7 2.2 2.2 0.5
BSK 3.9 1.4 24.6 4.0 76.1 2.2 2.0 0.5
EXP 6.5 23.1 2.7 39.2 7.9 1.2 1.4 0.9
INQUIM 4.1 2.1 17.7 5.8 53.5 1.5 0.9 0.9
EXCL 4.0 3.5 15.7 9.7 50.3 1.1 0.9 1.0
SERV 56.2 40.1 10.3 7.9 2.3 0.9 0.9 1.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: Based on data from BCU and INE.
(*) Ratio between factor intensity in each sector and total factor intensity.
3. THE MODEL
The structure of the CGE model is quite conventional in terms of the analysis of
trade-related issues but alternative assumptions are made regarding market structures:
perfect or imperfect competition. It is a multi-sector model with nine sectors defined by the
groups obtained in the previous section. It is assumed that Uruguay is a small economy with
three trading partners (Argentina, Brazil and the rest of the world). The Uruguayan
economy is explicitly modeled while in the case of the other trading partners only the
supply of imports and the demand for exports are endogenous.
Uruguay has been a protected economy where oligopolistic markets have developed
and where the existence of regulations, trade unions and entrepreneurial associations
impose certain rigidities in factor markets. For this reason, the model includes those market
imperfections by means of modeling two different competitive behaviors in the
manufacturing sectors: i) perfect competition and ii) Bertrand-type competition with scale
economies and product differentiation. The model was run under the assumption of flexible
wages.
There are three factors of production: capital, skilled and unskilled labor (the labor
market is segmented by qualifications). The supply of each factor is fixed and there is no
international mobility. Two alternative assumptions were made regarding factor mobility: i)
all factors are perfectly mobile across sectors and ii) capital and skilled labor are sector-9
specific factors, while unskilled labor is perfectly mobile across sectors.
It is assumed that there is only one representative consumer. Government only
collects tariffs and makes transfers to consumers as a lump-sum.
The perfectly competitive sectors operate with constant returns to scale and the price
of the produced good is equal to the variable unit cost. In the imperfect competition sectors
it is assumed that firms have monopoly power associated to their capacity to differentiate
their products. This monopoly power enables them to determine their prices both in the
domestic and the external markets. In these sectors, firms operate with decreasing average
costs and they apply a mark-up on variable unit costs. Prices are determined à la Bertrand,
assuming competitors do not react to the firm’s decisions. There is free entry, so the number
of firms is endogenous. There are no benefits in the long run.
On the production side, firms combine intermediate inputs with capital, skilled and
unskilled labor. In the competitive sectors the production functions are neoclassical with
constant returns to scale. In the noncompetitive sectors, there are increasing returns to scale
because there are fixed costs, not depending on the quantity produced.
In the perfectly competitive sectors, goods differ by geographic origin, being
imperfect substitutes in consumption (Armington). The small country assumption is made
for imports, so the country faces a perfectly elastic supply curve in the external markets. It
is also assumed that the country faces a downward sloping demand curve for exports.
In the imperfect competition sectors there is product differentiation at the firm level
and each firm faces negatively sloped demand curves in all three external markets. The
price in each market is determined as a function of the variable unit cost, the elasticity of
demand and the share of the firm in each market.
The representative consumer maximizes a utility function subject to his budget
constrain (total national income). The utility function is separable and follows a Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) specification. In turn, each of the trading partners has a single representative
consumer who maximizes a similar utility function but in these cases their total income and
their domestic prices are exogenous. Total demand for each sector is composed by domestic
demand (intermediate and final) plus exports to each of the trading partners.
The model closure adopted was a fixed trade balance, so that imports and exports of
goods and services maintain the difference existing in the benchmark data. The equilibrium
in the model is defined by the simultaneous equilibrium in goods markets, in factor markets
and in the external sector. The equations of the model are presented in the Appendix.10
4. CALIBRATION AND SIMULATIONS
This section describes the methodology for the simulations. First of all, the
construction of the SAM and the calibration of the model are reported. Then, the
experiments are described.
4.1 Parameter calibration
The  “benchmark” data for calibrating the model was taken from Lorenzo et al
(1999) who built a Social Accounting Matrix for the year 1995, just when the special
regimes of Mercosur started. This SAM gathered data from different sources and made it
compatible, having the National Accounting System as a framework. The task implied the
updating of the existing input-output matrix (for the year 1983) and its combination with
trade data and others. The aggregation level of this SAM was not exactly coincident with
what was needed to calibrate the model so some further work was done to adapt it to this
purpose.
In order to calibrate the model it was necessary to introduce extraneous values for
the elasticity of substitution between factors of production and between domestic and
imported goods.
As the model only considers three factors of production, it was assumed that all the
rest of value added (once labor payments and indirect taxes are deducted) is the payment to
capital. Therefore, land is considered as capital and its rent is included as a return to capital.
Labor was classified as “skilled” or “unskilled” following the same criterion adopted by
Cassoni and Labadie (1999), that is, the unskilled are the blue collar workers. All the rest
are considered “skilled”.
The elasticities of substitution between capital and labor and between skilled and
unskilled labor were taken from the econometric estimates presented in Cassoni and
Labadie (1999), based on the microdata from the Industrial Survey carried out from 1987 to
1995. The values for the elasticities of substitution between goods from different
geographic origin were taken from the literature.
Finally, there was no recent data available in relation to market structures.
Therefore, the key parameters were calibrated directly, assuming zero profits. It is assumed
that the imperfect competition sectors are ALIREG, BSK, EXCL, EXPRO, INQUIM and
OREG. In turn, the sectors EXP, PRIM and SERV are perfectly competitive. Each of these
sectors produces a single good. The number of firms in each sector was obtained from the
Herfindhal index calculated using data from 1988 Economic Census.11
4.2 Simulations
The experiments were designed to analyze the impact of trade policy changes in
Uruguay, due to the elimination of the special regimes of Mercosur and its consolidation as
a perfect CU. The following experiments were carried out:
a) Elimination of the Adapting Regime.
This experiment simulates the impact of the elimination of all the exceptions to free
trade inside the zone and to the CET for the items included in the Adapting Regime. It
simulates the change in tariffs occurred from January 1995 to January 2000. To calibrate
the initial equilibrium the average tariffs in force in 1995 were considered, both for intra-
zone trade and for trade with third countries (see Table 3). The intra-zone tariff was
lowered to zero and the extra-zone tariff was set at the approved CET level. Two sectors
remained unchanged: EXCL and SERV. As it was said before, the first one includes sectors
whose treatment has not been agreed yet (automotive, sugar and oil refining). The second
one includes all activities whose trade is not affected by tariffs.
b) Elimination of all the special regimes.
Taking the results of the first experiment as the starting point, the second
experiment simulates the elimination of all the exceptions to the CET (including those of
the Uruguayan list that will be completely eliminated by the year 2001).
5 The convergence
schedules were presented in Table 3.
Both experiments imply a discriminatory reduction of tariffs applied to goods
originated in the Mercosur. The difference between them is the change in the external tariffs
applicable to goods originated outside the Mercosur. In the first experiment, the latter have
a moderate decrease, while in the second one they increase moderately. In either case the
preference received by goods originated in the Mercosur countries increases, thus
deepening the discriminatory character of trade policy.
The policy changes simulated also discriminate by sectors. The first experiment
mainly affects protection from intra-zone imports for three sectors: the protected exporting
sectors (EXPRO), the food industries with intense intra-zone trade (ALIREG) and other
intra-zone exporting sectors (OREG). The second experiment adds an increase in protection
from imports originated in third countries mainly for two sectors: BSK (capital goods,
computer and telecommunications goods) and INQUIM (intermediate chemicals).
                                                
5  The elimination of the Uruguayan list of exceptions by the year 2001 introduce relatively minor
changes in average tariffs, so it was not justified to carry out a specific simulation for that case.12
The model and the experiments were run in GAMS.
5. RESULTS
The first important finding from the simulations is that the overall effects of both
experiments are rather low. Real income does not change by more than 1% in any of the
simulations carried out. The most significant changes are observed in the trade flows.
However, there are some relevant changes in terms of factor allocation, and factor demand
by sector.
This exercise confirms in a moderate way the findings of other studies carried out
with CGEs: the effect of trade policy changes are higher when market imperfections are
considered. The overall changes on trade, relative prices and production by sector are higher
in the simulations with imperfect competition than in those with perfect competition.
5.1 First experiment: Elimination of the Adapting Regime
In this section the results obtained from the simulation of the elimination of the
Adapting Regime are presented.
- Global effects
Table 5 shows the overall results, which are quite similar under different
assumptions concerning market structure and factor mobility. Real GDP and real income
fall –0,1%, the terms of trade decrease 0,6 or 0,7% and the exchange rate increases between
0,6 to 0,8%.
Under perfect competition, tariff reduction lowers the domestic price of foreign
goods. Real imports increase by 0,5% as a result. Simultaneously, the fall in import prices
(through its effect on intermediates) translates into lower prices for domestic goods.
Therefore, domestic output becomes more competitive in foreign markets and real exports
increase by 1,1%.  There is a slight change in the real returns on capital and labor while
labor productivity remains constant.13
Table 5














Real income -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Real exports 1.1 2.4 1.1 2.4
Real imports 0.5 1.7 0.5 1.7
Terms of trade -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7
Exchange rate 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8
Real return to capital 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Real wage 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Real skilled wage 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Real unskilled wage 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Labor productivity 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
When imperfect competition is assumed,
6 the results are not too different. Real
exports increase 2,4% while real imports show a 1,7% increase. The trade response is larger
in the Bertrand model because product differentiation at the firm level implies higher
elasticities of substitution.
These general findings do not change significantly when it is assumed that capital
and skilled labor are specific factors with no mobility across sectors. The overall effects
remain low.
The global effects on the labor market are a weighted average of the changes
occurred in each sector. As a consequence, the results can be ambiguous and should be
complemented with the sectoral analysis below.
The overall results on the labor market are very low. The intra-zone liberalization
causes a slight fall in both real wages of skilled and unskilled labor. In the model with
specific factors the results are very similar.
- Effects by sector
In order to simplify the comments, only the results for the imperfect competition
model are presented. This option is justified given the characteristics of the Uruguayan
economy and the slight differences in the results. Table 6 shows the changes in output,
                                                
6  It should be remembered that in all the versions of the model it was assumed that the typically
exporting sector (EXP), the primary sector (PRIM) and the service sector (SERV), were perfectly
competitive and price-takers in foreign trade.14
consumption, trade, markups, number of firms and output per firm by sector.
In the simulations with perfect factor mobility, the results by sector are consistent
with neoclassical theory. The fall in protection causes a reduction in domestic prices for all
goods, especially those that are more exposed to competition from intra-zone imports.
Thus, three effects are found: i) there is a reallocation of consumption towards those goods
whose tariffs suffered the largest reduction (EXPRO and OREG), ii) output falls in two of
the most affected sectors (ALIREG and OREG) while it increases in the other sectors
(including the EXPRO sector) , iii) competitiveness in foreign markets improve due to the
fall in prices of intermediate imports.
Table 6
Experiment 1: Effects on consumption, output and trade by sector

















EXP -0,2 -0.2 1.3 -0.1 0.4 nc nc nc
PRIM -0,2 -0.1 1.3 0.1 0,2 nc nc nc
SERV -0,2 -0.2 1,3 -1.3 0,0 nc nc nc
Bertrand competition sectors
ALIREG -0,1 -0.5 4.8 12.0 -0,4 0,0 -0,6 0,1
BSK -0,1 0.9 4.5 -1.1 0,9 0,0 0,9 0,0
EXCL -0,3 1.2 3.2 -2.6 1.1 -0,2 1.0 0,2
EXPRO 0,2 -1.2 5.2 14.6 0,1 -0,2 -0,4 0,5
INQUIM -0,1 -0.1 4.5 0.3 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,1
OREG 0,7 -4.8 5.9 16.1 -2,0 0,0 -2,4 0,3
The effect of the elimination of the Adapting Regime on real imports from sectors
EXPRO, ALIREG and OREG is quite noticeable (they grow from 12% to 16%). On the
other hand, sectors differ by their exporting behavior, which in turn, affects output
behavior. In most sectors, the increase in exports compensates the contraction of domestic
demand and enables a rise in output. However, in the case of ALIREG and OREG,  the
export increase is not enough to compensate the fall in domestic demand and there is a
contraction in output.
All sectors increase their exports, but this effect is larger for non competitive
sectors, particularly those most affected by the tariff reduction. In the sectors under
imperfect competition, domestic firms determine their selling price in the domestic market
and abroad using the monopoly power derived from product differentiation. In those sectors15
the increase in exports is due to the price reduction of domestic goods, which improves
their competitiveness abroad. In turn, this price reduction can be explained by the fall in the
price of intermediate imports, and their feedback effect on the domestic goods’ prices.
In the EXPRO sector, which had a high export share in output in the benchmark, the
significant export increase (5,2%) fully compensates the fall in domestic demand and output
increases. In contrast, the sectors ALIREG and OREG, severely affected by the elimination
of the Adapting Regime -but whose share of exports in total output was much lower-,  show
an export expansion that is not enough to compensate the fall in domestic demand. As a
result, the output of these sectors show a contraction (-0,4% y –2,0%, respectively).
There are no significant changes in mark-ups. In the new equilibrium, some firms
disappear in the three most affected sectors while new firms arrive in the BSK and EXCL
sectors. The combined effect of the changes in output and in the number of firms enables
some sectors to take better advantage of scale economies, as the output per firm indicator
shows. The largest effect of this kind is found in the EXPRO and OREG sectors.
The results under the specific factor assumption were quite similar, so they are not
presented in the table. When specific factors are assumed, in the most affected sectors by
the elimination of the Adapting Regime, markups fall as a result of the change in
competition, even in the case of the EXPRO sector whose output increases. On the contrary,
in BSK and EXCL markups rise.
The sectoral variations analyzed above affect factor markets. Table 7 shows the
changes in factor allocation by sector. These effects are the expected but not relevant. There
is a reallocation from the most affected sectors (labor intensive) towards all the rest,
particularly to the less affected non competitive sectors (BSK and EXCL). As the relative
return to capital is higher (see Table 5) all sectors change their technology towards a more
intense use of labor.
However there is no direct relation between the tariff reduction in each sector and its
factor intensity. This explains why the discriminatory opening policy causes a reallocation
of factors without significant changes in their relative demand. The contracting sectors are
labor intensive (OREG and ALIREG), while the expanding ones are intensive in skilled
labor (BSK, INQUIM), unskilled labor (EXP) or capital (PRIM). The contracting sectors
weight relatively less in output and employment. The net effect is an increase in the relative
return to capital. According to these results, the elimination of the Adapting Regime should
not bring significant changes on the functional distribution of income.16
Table 7
Experiment 1: Effects on factor allocation with perfect mobility






ALIREG -0.6 -0,5 -0,5
BSK 0.8 0.9 0.9
EXCL 1.1 1.2 1.2
EXP 0.4 0.6 0.6
EXPRO -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
INQUIM 0,1 0,2 0,2
OREG -2.4 -2.3 -2.3
PRIM 0,2 0,2 0,2
SERV 0,0 0,0 0,0
In the model with specific factors, the unskilled labor demand rises in BSK, EXCL
and EXP sectors -where output grows- and fall in ALIREG and OREG sectors (see Table
8). Unskilled labor moves from the ALIREG and OREG sectors (-0.1% and -0.2%
respectively) to the BSK, EXP and EXCL sectors (0.1% in each of them).
Skilled labor and capital are assumed as sector-specific, so there is no reallocation in
their case. Theory suggests that the returns of specific factors of the sectors affected by a
tariff reduction will go down while they will increase in the rest of the sectors. That is
precisely what can be observed in Table 8 where the real wage for skilled labor and real
capital return falls in ALIREG, OREG and EXPRO. Factor productivity decrease in
ALIREG and OREG, but it goes up in EXPRO. This is not a typical result of a sector-
specific model but it should be remembered that in our Bertrand model the non competitive
sectors are working in the downward side of the cost curve. In the EXPRO sector the
number of firms goes down but export growth generates an increase in the scale of
production.
In sum, when perfect factor mobility is assumed, a reallocation of factors is
observed from the sectors most affected by the elimination of the Adapting Regime to all
other sectors. In turn, when specific factors are assumed, an increase in real wage for skilled
labor is observed in those sectors whose output grows.17
Table 8
Experiment 1: Effects on the labor market with specific factors









Employment wage return Unskilled Skilled productivity
ALIREG -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
BSK 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3
EXCL 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
EXP 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2
EXPRO 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
INQUIM 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
OREG -0.2 -2.1 -1.6 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7
PRIM 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1
SERV 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
One final aspect that should be noticed is what refers to the effect of the elimination
of the Adapting Regime on trade flows, particularly in terms of trade creation and trade
diversion.
Table 9 shows a remarkable increase in imports from the sectors most affected by
the tariff reduction. There are also significant changes in the share of imports from the
Mercosur countries and from the rest of the world. The imports from the Mercosur
countries increase while they decrease from the rest of the world, particularly in sectors
where preferences get larger. The convergence to the CET of the items included in the
Adapting Regime might generate some trade diversion costs. However, the increase in
intra-zone imports may also give rise to trade creation since in several sectors imports
increase substituting for domestic production.18
Table 9
Experiment 1: Effects on sectoral imports with perfect factor mobility
Bertrand competition, flexible wages
Percentage variations
IMPORTS
Argentina Brazil Rest of the
world
Total
ALIREG 17.8 20.0 -4.0 12.0
BSK 3,0 2.9 -2.6 -1.1
EXCL -2.8 -2.7 -2.5 -2.6
EXP 0.2 0.2 -0.7 -0.1
EXPRO 27.2 26.2 0.6 14.6
INQUIM 3.0 3.0 -2.4 0.3
OREG 31.6 31.3 -4.8 16.1
PRIM 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.1
SERV -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3
5.2 Second experiment: Elimination of all exceptions to the CET
This experiment simulates the effect of the elimination of all the to the CET (except
the automotive and sugar sectors). The experiment signifies an increase in the average
protection with third countries received by all sectors (see Table 3). This increase is
significant in three sectors: BSK (6.6%), EXCL (3.6%) and INQUIM (0.4%), which
represent 58% of total imports in 1998. Therefore, this experiment simulates a reversion of
trade opening with the rest of the world. As it was said before, this experiment simulates
the situation that will take place by January 2006.
Basically, the elimination of the exceptions to the CET moves in the opposite
direction to the elimination of the Adapting Regime, since it increases protection in most
sectors. However, it should be noticed that in both cases there is a deepening of intra-zone
preferences.
As it was said before, the results presented in this section show the changes
simulated starting from the results of the previous experiment.
- Global effects
When perfect factor mobility is assumed, the overall results are very similar under
all the assumptions adopted (see Table 10). Real income and real GDP increase less than
0.2%. Trade flows decrease -particularly real exports-, and the results are larger under the
assumption of imperfect competition. The terms of trade improve while the exchange rate
falls by a similar percentage. There is a slight variation in factor returns (less than 1%). The19
real return on capital decrease relative to the average wage.
Table 10













Real income 0,1 0,2 0.1 0.1
Real exports -1.4 -2.2 -1.3 -1.7
Real imports -0,7 -1.2 -0.6 -0.9
Terms of trade 0,7 1.2 0,7 0,9
Exchange rate -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8
Real return on
capital
-0,2 -0,3 -0.2 -0.1
Real wage 0,0 0,6 -0,1 0,0
Real skilled wage 0,0 0.7 -0,1 0,0
Real unskilled
wage
-0.1 0.4 -0,1 0,0
Labor productivity 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0
As it was said in the case of the first experiment, the overall effects on the labor
market are the result of very different situations by sectors. Therefore, they should be
considered together with the results presented below for each sector.
- Sectoral effects
As it was mentioned before, the elimination of all the exceptions and the completion
of the CU of Mercosur lead to a rise in protection in some sectors (BSK and INQUIM) and
the maintenance of existing tariffs in the sector EXCL. The expected effects should be a
reduction in their demand (due to higher prices) and a rise in output.
The sectoral results show an important increase in the consumption of domestic
goods from the BSK and EXCL sectors (8,2% and 2,3% respectively). Therefore, domestic
output substitutes for imports in those sectors due to the increase in tariffs. Consequently,
exports also fall.
In the model with perfect factor mobility, the sector BSK is the one where the
largest changes in output are observed. Its output grows 6,1% and the number of firms
5,8%, but no significant change is observed in markups or in the scale of production. This
means that the completion of the CU would not bring substantial advantages in terms of20
economies of scale or in terms of greater competition in the domestic market. On the
contrary, it might bring important costs in terms of trade diversion in a sector with great
impact on the rest of the economy. Output also rises in EXCL where the number of firms
increases. In all other sectors output and the number of firms fall.
Table 11
Experiment 2: Sectoral effects on output, consumption and trade















With perfect factor mobility
ALIREG 0.3 0.2 -4.0 3.1 -0.1 0,0 -0.2 0.1
BSK -0.2 8.2 -4.8 -9.6 6.1 -0,1 5.8 0,3
EXCL 0.2 2.3 -3.7 -2.7 1.0 -0.1 1.0 0.0
EXP 0.4 0.3 -1.3 1.0 -0.5 nc nc nc
EXPRO 0.0 -0.2 -4.2 3.9 -1.6 0.2 -1.5 -0.1
INQUIM 0.3 0.2 -3.9 2.2 -0.2 0,0 -0.3 0.2
OREG 0.3 -1.1 -4.3 4.0 -1,0 0,1 -1.2 0.2
PRIM 0,4 0.4 -1.2 1.2 -0.4 nc nc nc
SERV 0.3 0.2 -1.5 1.6 0,0 nc nc nc
As for the effects on factor reallocation when perfect mobility is assumed, the
results are shown in Table 12.  It can be observed that factor demand increases
approximately 6% in the sector whose tariffs rise the most (BSK) and approximately 1% in
the sector not included in the Mercosur agreements (EXCL). In all other sectors factor
demand decreases. Therefore, factor reallocation takes place from the sectors most affected
by the elimination of exceptions towards the rest.21
Table 12
Experiment 2: Effects on factor allocation with perfect mobility






ALIREG -0.1 -0.5 -0.5
BSK 6.1 5.6 5.7
EXCL 1.0 0.7 0.8
EXP -0.4 -1.1 -1.1
EXPRO -1.4 -1.9 -1.8
INQUIM -0.3 -0.5 -0.5
OREG -1.1 -1.4 -1.3
PRIM -0.4 -0.7 -0.7
SERV 0.1 0.0 0.0
In the model with specific factors, the reallocation of the only mobile factor
(unskilled labor) is rather small (see table 13). Instead, the returns on the specific factors
(skilled labor and capital) of the most affected sector (BSK) is quite noticeable (4,2% and
3%). In all other sectors the returns on specific factor fall. Factor productivity increases only
in the BSK sector which takes advantage of scale economies.
Table 13









employment wage return Unskilled Skilled productivity
ALIREG 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
BSK 0.5 4.2 3.0 1.5 2.0 2.0
EXCL 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1
EXP -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
EXPRO -0.1 -1.2 -0.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
INQUIM 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
OREG -0.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
PRIM -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
SERV 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
One final aspect to consider is the impact of the elimination of the exceptions on
imports. In the model with perfect factor mobility, there are relevant effects of opposite
signs (see Table 14). In the BSK and EXCL sectors there is a substantial fall in total
imports together with a large increase in imports from the Mercosur countries. This result
signals the possible existence of a strong trade diversion effect which is particularly serious,22
given the large share of total imports that belong to these sectors. In those most affected by
the intra-zone liberalization, imports show an increase, mainly from the Mercosur countries.
This result suggests there is a trade creation effect in ALIREG, OREG and INDQUIM.
Table 14
Experiment 2: Effects on imports with perfect factor mobility
Bertrand competition, flexible wage
Percentage variations
IMPORTS
Sector Argentina Brazil Rest of the
world
Total
ALIREG 3.1 3.4 2.8 3.1
BSK 7.2 6.8 -15.9 -9.6
EXCL 4.8 4.4 -10.3 -2.7
EXP 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0
EXPRO 4.2 4.0 3.5 3.9
INQUIM 3.5 3.5 0.8 2.2
OREG 4.5 4.4 3.0 4.0
PRIM 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2
SERV 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
6. CONCLUSIONS
The results presented in this paper are caused by opposite forces. On the one hand,
the intra-zone tariffs fall in a discriminatory way. On the other hand, tariffs with third
countries fall moderately in the first experiment but rise moderately in the second. In either
case, the preference received by imports from the Mercosur countries increase in all sectors,
deepening the discriminatory character of trade policy.
The first important finding of this exercise is that the overall impact in both
experiments is quite low. Real GDP and real income remain almost unchanged. The most
significant changes are found in trade flows and in the relation between domestic and
foreign prices.
The second finding to be emphasized is that none of the policy changes that were
simulated has relevant effects on the aggregated labor market. However, this global result
should be taken cautiously because at the sectoral level there are effects with opposite signs
that compensate in the aggregate.
The welfare effect that can be found due to the existence of imperfect competition
also seems quite modest. The procompetitive trade effect does not appear to be important,
given the minor decrease in markups. The same thing can be said about the scale effect as23
no significant increase in firms’ size is found. Finally, the most important variation in
welfare could originate in the variety effect due to the increase in imports.
As for trade flows, the growth in intra-zone imports is coupled with a decrease in
imports from the rest of the world, particularly in those sectors where preferences deepen
the most. This result might be interpreted as a signal of the existence of trade diversion
costs in some sectors.
The effects are quite large in some sectors. On the one hand, in those most affected
by the intra-zone liberalization, there is a significant increase in imports, mainly from the
Mercosur countries (ALIREG and OREG). On the other hand, in the sector BSK, whose
tariffs increase for third countries the elimination of all the exceptions in Mercosur cause a
substantial fall in total imports while intra-zone imports increase. This result suggests that a
serious trade diversion effect may occur in a sector that represents a large share of total
Uruguayan imports and which plays a crucial role in the technological development of the
country.
When perfect factor mobility is assumed the elimination of the Adapting Regime
generates a reallocation of resources and changes in consumption. Factors of production
move from the three sectors most affected by this experiment (labor intensive) to the other
sectors. However, as the tariff reduction is not directly correlated with factor intensity in
each sector, the discriminatory opening causes a reallocation of resources without
significant changes in the relative factor demand. Therefore, the elimination of the
Adapting Regime should not cause significant changes in income distribution.
As the sectors considered by the model are relatively aggregated, it is not easy to
identify winners and losers based on theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, in the factor-
specific model, it is clear that the specific factors (capital and skilled labor) of the sectors
ALIREG, OREG and EXPRO are the most affected by the elimination of the Adapting
Regime. Those sectors show a decline in unskilled labor use and a fall in the real wage of
skilled workers and in capital return.
In the second experiment (the elimination of exceptions to the CET), the rise in
protection leads to a demand decrease and an increase in output of the BSK sector, where
the most relevant changes take place. No significant variations are found in markups or in
firm size, so the procompetitive or scale effects on welfare are rather small. On the contrary,
there are signals of possible trade diversion effects, mainly in the BSK sector.
This second experiment generates a reallocation of resources towards the sectors
whose protection increases in relation to third countries. The reallocation is effective mainly
through the entry or exit of firms in each sector and the changes in firms’ size.24
When specific factors are assumed in the second experiment the owners of capital
and the skilled workers of the BSK and EXCL sectors improve their factor returns. This
sector also benefits from a positive scale effect. On the other hand, it is in this sector where
the greatest trade diversion effects might occur.25
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APPENDIX
The equations of the CGE model are presented in this appendix. Capital fonts
indicate variables (endogenous or exogenous), lower fonts and Greek fonts indicate
parameters. The subscripts i, j refer to sectors and the subscripts z, t refer to geographic
zones as follows:
i, j =  PRIM, EXPRO, ALIREG, OREG, BSK, EXP, INQUIM, EXCL, SERV
z = Uruguay (U), Argentina (A), Brazil (B), rest of the world (r)
t = A, B, r
Each sector combines primary factors and intermediate inputs following a Cobb-
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where VU is variable unit cost, PN is value added price, PCI is the composite price of
intermediate inputs and tind is the percentage of indirect taxes paid by the sector. α  and ω
are the distribution and scale parameters (respectively) of the production function.
In turn, value added is a combination of labor and capital especified as a CES. Thus,
PN is:
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where R and W, are the rate of return to capital and the wage rate , respectively. δ  y β  are the
distribution and scale parameters of the CES function for value added, while σ  is the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
As the model considers that the labor market is segmented, the average wage is a
combination of wages for both types of labor. It was assumed that skilled and unskilled
labor are combined following a CES function, so the average wage is:
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where  WNC and WC are the wages for unskilled and skilled labor, ξ  and ϕ  are the
distribution and scale parameters and θ  is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor.
In the imperfect competition sectors, the intermediate inputs are differentiated at the
firm level and are combined with an Armington formulation. It is assumed that all firms are
the same sized for each sector in each zone, so the composite price of intermediates is:
















where P is the domestic price of goods from each zone, NF is the number of firms for each
sector in each zone, γ  is the CES distribution parameter and φ  is the elasticity of substitution
between goods from different origin. In the perfect competition sectors, NF is equal to one.
For the perfectly competitive sectors, the total cost for each firm includes the








where Qi  is output of sector i, NFUj  is the number of firms of sector i in Uruguay and F the
fixed costs. These are defines as:
() ( ) i i i i i i i tind R fk WNC fnc WC fc F + + + = 1 . . .
where fc is the fixed amount of skilled labor used by sector i, fnc the fixed amount of
unskilled labor and fk  the fixed amount of capital.
The demand for intermediate inputs, labor and capital in each sector is obtained


























where Xzji  is the demand for the input j coming from country z and used by sector i for the
production of one unit. It is a decreasing function of the input price.
Labor demand is a decreasing function of the wage rate and is an increasing function29











































































































In the competitive sectors, the equilibrium price of output is equal to its variable unit
cost VU:
i ui VU P =     when i= competitive sectors
where Pui is the price of goods produced in Uruguay.
In the imperfect competition sectors goods are differentiated at the firm level. Firms
determine their prices adding a markup on variable unit cost. It is assumed that firms have
no profits and the markup just enables them to cover their fixed costs. Then the domestic
and export prices will be:
Ui i ui M VU P . =   when i= imperfect competition sectors
where M is the percentage markup on variable unit cost, which depends on the demand
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 and shzi the share of each firm in each market.
In the imperfect competition sectors, foreign firms also apply a markup to determine
their export price. So the import price for Uruguay is:
) 1 ( . . bi zi bi ui ER M PW P τ + =
where PW is the international price, τ  is the tariff and ER is the exchange rate. In the perfect
competition sectors, M equals one.
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and she is the share of each firm’s exports in the destination market.
Total profits for each sector are defined as the difference between sales and output
costs:
i i i i i NF CT PQ Q . . − = π31
Consumers maximize a Cobb Douglas utility function, subject to their budget
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where PF is the price of final goods:


































C  is the consumption of a composite of differentiated goods with an Armington
formulation. The goods are differentiated by firms (in imperfect competition) or by





















The export demand is a decreasing function of the export price:
i i
iz iz z iz iz PM PE Y E
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1 . . .
where PM is the average price index prevailing in the destination country and Y is that
country’s income (exogenous variable).
Income is endogenous and is the sum of the returns to factors of production, the
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The equilibrium conditions in the labor market are:
i i i i i UC NF fc LC LCS + + = .
∑ + + =
i
i i i UNC NF fnc LNC LNCS ) . (
where  LCS and LNS are the supply of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. Both
variables are exogenous. UC and UNC are unemployment of skilled and unskilled labor,
respectively. In the versions of the model where it is assumed that real wage is fixed, UC
and UNC are endogenous variables. On the contrary, if it is assumed that wages are flexible,
UC and UNC remain constant.
The equilibrium equation for capital is:
i i i i NF fk K KS . + =
where KS is capital supply (exogenous).
It should be noticed that these equilibrium equations in factor markets assume that
skilled labor and capital are specific factors, with no mobility accross sectors. In that case,
supply and demand for those factors should be in equilibrium in each sector. On the
contrary, in the simulations with perfect factor mobility, supply and demand for all factors
should be in equilibrium in the aggregate.
The equilibrium conditions in the goods market require the equalization of supply
and demand in each sector:
∑∑ + + =
jt
it j uij ui i E Q X D Q .
Finally, the external equilibrium is:
B M PW Q X M PW D PE E ti tj
it ijt
i tji ti ti ti
it
it it = − − ∑∑ ∑∑∑ ∑∑ . . . .
In all the simulations B remain constant.